The Quality of Bank Loans: A Study of Bank Examination Records by Albert M. Wojnilower
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Quality of Bank Loans: A Study of Bank Examination
Records





Chapter Title: Introduction and Summary
Chapter Author: Albert M. Wojnilower
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2103
Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 4)1
Introduction and Summary
The confidential files of bank examiners, which are a veritable treasure
trove of financial data, were one of several new sources explored in the
Quality of Credit Program. This paper, presents a sampling of the
statistical material gathered by the National Bureau from such exam-
ination files of three Federal Reserve banks, which were made available
for the first time for research purposes. Stringent measures were taken,
of course, to keep the reports of individual banks and borrowers con-
fidential. It is hoped that the promising results obtained in this work,
essentially a pilot study, will eventually lead to the current assembling
and publication of pertinent statistics from bank examinations.
Before summarizing the results of this paper, a brief outline of the
contents may be in order. Chapter 2 describes the bank examination
process asit bears on criticism of loans, and briefly sketches and
evaluates the aggregate statistical results. Chapter 3 investigates the
relation between the incidence of criticism by examiners and the in-
dustry and size of the borrower, and compares the results with those
yielded by other measures of loan quality. Chapter 4 explores the
aggregate data for criticism rates over time and compares their behavior
with other indicators of credit quality. The fifth and final chapter
describes the many types of valuable statistical information that are
locked up in the bank examination records and urges a program for
their publication in summary form.
Summary of Findings
The principal conclusions of the study summarized below are tentative
and subject to important qualifications, because of the limitations of
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the data and because in most instances inferences had to be drawn
from incomplete and not necessarily clear-cut evidence. In particular,
the sample of banks and loans employed is very small and in some
respects unrepresentative. The conclusions are, therefore, perhaps best
regarded as illustrative of the kinds of results that might be obtained
from this type of data if they were available for a large number of banks
over an extended period.
1. In the course of the annual examination of a bank, many of its
business loans are evaluated individually. Some of these loans may be
formally "classified" (i.e., criticized as excessively risky). During 1951-
57, the dollar volume of all criticized loans (business and otherwise) at
the sixty commercial banks in our sample was on the order of 1 per cent
of the loan total (Chapter 2). This was well below the rate that pre-
vailed at these banks during 1947-50, and below the rate at all insured
commercial banks during 1939-49. (Data for insured banks were pub-
lished by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for 1939-51.) In
most banks, almost all criticized loans are business loans, partly because
most other loans are small in size and not subject to individual exam-
ination. The incidence of criticized business loans averaged on the
order of 2 per cent during 1953-57.
Roughly four-fifths of the criticized loans are usually classified as
"substandard," meaning that they involve substantial risk of nonpay-
ment. The remainder are classified as "doubtful" or "loss," indicating
that partial or total charge-off of the loan seems inevitable. For 1947-57,
from 55 to 75 per cent of the sample banks, including most of the larger
banks, had less than 1 per cent of their total loans classified as sub-
standard in any given year. Most of the remaining banks had rates
below 5 per cent, but in almost every year a few exceeded this ratio
(Chapter 4).
2. The incidence of criticism by examiners varies considerably with
the industry and size of the borrower (Chapter 3). Within most in-
dustries, loans to smaller borrowers incurred criticism more frequently
than loans to larger firms, but the incidence for small •firms in some
industries—for example, nondurables manufacturing and finance—was
below that for large firm.s in other industries. (These results refer to
1957, the only year for which this particular type of information was
obtained.) The pattern of the criticism rates for twenty-four industry-
size groups (e.g., "large" finance companies or "medium-sized" retailers)
on the whole resembled that shown by other measures of loan quality
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cross-classified in this way, such as loan loss rates for Chicago Federal
Reserve District member banks, and Dun and Bradstreet credit ratings.
These various indicators of loan quality and relevant data from the
Bank Examination Survey suggest, moreover, that the ranking of in-
dustry-size groups by loan "quality" remains fairly stable over time.
3. Data on examiner criticism of total loans (without reference to
type of loan, industry, size, or any other borrower attributes), which
were available for 1947-57, show that the annual changes in the criticism
rate were quite consistent with the changes in industry and size com-
position of loans and in financial ratios, as well as with those in other
indicators of loan quality, such as credit ratings and business failures
and discontinuances (Chapter 4). The only clear divergence occurred
in 1957, when it appears that examiner standards, if defined narrowly
in terms of borrower financial ratios, may have become less stringent.
Of course, many other factors besides financial ratios enter into ex-
amination standards.
4. The sample was too small to yield quarterly data for criticism
rates. However a quarterly "diffusion" index was constructed for 1948-
57, giving for each quarter the percentage of those banks examined that
showed declines in criticism rates (higher "quality") from the previous
examination. The index itself fluctuated quite erratically, but a four-
quarter moving average showed a distinct cyclical pattern. The moving
average rose during business contractions, attaining its peak rather
early in the ensuing business expansion. It declined during the later
stages of the business expansion, falling to its trough prior to the onset
of recession.'
1Certain additional results of the study are included in my "Changes in the
Quality of Business Loans of Commercial Banks," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University, December 1960. Briefly stated, these are:
A. Banks apparently take industry and size differentials in risk into account in
their lending policy. They usually lend to a larger proportion of business firms in
industry and size groups with lower criticism rates and to a smaller proportion of
firms in groups with higher criticism rates. It appears that during business cycle
expansions, high-risk industries become more prominent among the borrowers, but
the resulting increase in risk is offset by a decline in the proportion of loans out-
standing to the generally riskier small borrowers. The process seems to. be reversed
during times of business contraction and early recovery.
B. Changes in loan quality over time within industry-size groups were ana-
lyzed from balance-sheet data available for 1953-57 for many of the borrowers
who were on the books of these banks in 1957. The financial ratios calculated for
3The Quality of Bank Loans
these firms were, on the whole, consistent indicators of loan quality and also were
of predictive value since the relative financial standing of groups of firms tended
to remain stable over time despite changing levels of financial ratios. For this group
of borrowers, loan quality as measured by financial ratios apparently showed little.
over-all change in 1954, declined in 1955, rose in 1956, and fell once more in 1957.
C. In addition, changes in the credit standards of the banks over this period
were inferred by comparing the financial ratios of new borrowers in each year with
those of other borrower groups. Credit standards apparently eased in 1954 and 1955,
tightened in 1956, and eased again in 1957. The changes in credit standards applied
to new borrowers, moreover, were sufficient to affect appreciably .the direction of
change in the average financial ratios of the entire group.
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